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Abstract

mirrors an organizational hierarchy. In an HIBE system,
there is a root PKG who has a master secret key, some domain PKGs, and users. The domain PKGs and users are all
associated with their ID which are arbitrary strings. Root
PKG generates a private key for the top-level domain PKG.
The lower-level PKG requests a private key form their parent domain PKGs. Users ask for their private keys from
their domain PKGs. It is noticed that several efficient HIBE
schemes were proposed in [1, 2, 8, 11] with or without random oracles.

The notion of Identity-Based Online/Offline Encryption
(IBOOE) was recently introduced by Guo, Mu and Chen in
FC 2008. In an IBOOE system, the encryption is split into
online and offline phases. The offline phase is performed
prior to the arrival of a message and the recipient’s public key (or, identity). The online phase is performed very
efficiently after knowing the message and public key. The
IBOOE scheme is particularly useful for devices that have
very low computation power since part of computation is
conducted while the device is not busy. In this paper, we
extend the notion of IBOOE to the Hierarchical IdentityBased Online/Offline Encryption (HIBOOE), and propose a
“selective-ID” secure HIBOOE scheme from Boneh, Boyen
and Goh’s HIBE, where the online phase in HIBOOE is very
efficient.

Recently, Guo, Mu and Chen [7] introduced the notion of
identity-based online/offline encryption (IBOOE). The basic concept of online/offline encryption lies in splitting the
encryption algorithm into two phases, the first phase is performed offline prior to the arrival of a message to be encrypted and a public key (identity ID). The second phase
is performed online after knowing the message and ID. The
online phase is typically very fast and the offline phase is designed to handle the most costly computation. This scheme
is particularly useful for weak devices that do not have sufficient computation capacity.

Keywords: Identity based, encryption, online, offline.
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Introduction

In this paper, we extend the IBOOE to the Hierarchical
Identity-Based Online/Offline Encryption (HIBOOE) and
describe how to construct an HIBOOE scheme where the
public key is a multi-tuple vector of domain identities. Although the IBOOE [7] scheme from Boneh-Boyen IBE can
be extended to HIBOOE in a trivial way, the construction
unfortunately results in a longer ciphertext and multiple
modular computations in the online phase. In this paper,
we construct a much more efficient HIBOOE from another
HIBE [2], which was proposed by Boneh, Boyen and Goh
in 2005 to construct the constant ciphertext of HIBE. Our
HIBOOE scheme performs very efficiently in the online
phase which requires two modular computations only and
has a shorter ciphertext with k + 4 elements (where k is the

Identity Based Encryption (IBE) is a public key cryptsystem where any arbitrary string such as an email address
or a telephone number can be utilized as a valid public key.
The corresponding user private keys can only be computed
by a trusted third party called the Private Key Generator
(PKG) (who possesses a master secret key). The notion of
identity based cryptography was first proposed by Shamir
in 1984 [10]. This notion was later extended to IBE (e.g.,
[1, 3, 6, 12]). In a traditional IBE scheme, there is only
one PKG that distributes private keys for users. To improve
the efficiency of key generation, Horwitz and Lynn first introduced the notion of Hierarchical Identity-Based Encryption (HIBE) in [9]. HIBE is a generalization of IBE that
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length of the public key), compared to k + 1 modular computations and 2k + 3 elements of ciphertext length from the
Bonen-Boyen HIBE. Different to the HIBOOE construction
from the Boneh-Boyen HIBE scheme, the original security
proof for [2] is no longer adapted to our HIBOOE scheme.
Therefore, we give a new security proof in the selective
identity model in order to support our construction.

These queries may be asked adaptively according to the
replies of queries.
Challenge: Once the adversary decides that Phase 1
is over, it outputs two equal length plaintexts M0 , M1
on which it wishes to be challenged.
The challenger picks a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and sets C =
Encrypt(params, ID∗ , Mb ). It sends C as the challenge
to the adversary.

The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section
2, we provide the definitions of IBE/HIBE, including security requirements. In Sections 3, we present our HIBOOE
scheme from the Boneh, Boyen and Goh’s HIBE (BBGHIBE) scheme. We give a comparison in Section 4 and
conclude our paper in Section 5.

2

Phase 2: It is the same as Phase 1 but with a constraint that
the adversary makes a decryption query on Ci  = C for
ID∗ or any prefix of ID∗ .
Guess: The adversary outputs a guess b ∈ {0, 1} and wins
the game if b = b.

Preliminaries

2.1

We refer to such an adversary A as an IND-sID-CCA
adversary. We define the advantage of adversary A in attacking the scheme E as



1 


AdvE,A = Pr[b = b] −  .
2

Security models

An IBE system is composed of the four randomized
algorithms: Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt, and Decrypt for
master params and master secret key generation, private
key generation, encryption and decryption, respectively.
An -HIBE has a family of  key-generation algorithms
(KeyGeni for 1 ≤ i ≤ ). The public keys now forms a
multi-tuple vector. Algorithm KeyGeni takes as input an
identity ID = (I1 , · · · , Ii ) at depth i and the private key
dID|i−1 of the parent identity IDi−1 = (I1 , · · · , Ii−1 ) at
depth i − 1, then outputs the private key dID for identity
ID.
2.1.1

Definition 1 [1] We say that an HIBE system E is
(t, qID , qc , )-adaptively chosen ciphertext secure if for any
t-time IND-sID-CCA adversary A making at most qID chosen private key queries and at most qc chosen decryption
queries has advantage at most . As shorthand, we say that
E is (t, qID , qc , ) IND-sID-CCA secure.
Definition 2 [1] We say that an HIBE system E is
(t, qID , )-adaptively chosen plaintext secure if E is
(t, qID , 0, ) adaptively chosen ciphertext secure. As shorthand, we say that E is (t, qID , ) IND-sID-CPA secure.

IND-sID-CCA Model.

We describe the indistinguishable selective-identity chosenciphertext attack model as follows:

2.2

Initialization: The adversary outputs an identity ID∗ to be
challenged.

Bilinear Map

Let G and G1 be two cyclic groups of prime order p. Let
g be a generator of G. A map e : G × G → G1 is called a
bilinear map if this map satisfies the following properties:

Setup: The challenger inputs a security parameter 1k , and
then runs the algorithm Setup. It gives the adversary the
resulting master public parameters denoted by params and
keeps the master secret key to itself.

• Bilinear: for all u, v ∈ G and a, b ∈ Zp , we have
e(ua , v b ) = e(u, v)ab .

Phase 1: The adversary makes queries q1 , q2 , · · · , qm ,
where qi is one of the following:

• Non-degeneracy: e(g, g) = 1.

∗

• Key generation query on IDi  where IDi = ID and
IDi is not a prefix of ID∗ . The challenger responds
by running algorithm KeyGen to generate the private
key dIDi and sends it to the adversary.

2.3

• Decryption query IDi , Ci . The challenger responds
by running algorithm KeyGen to generate the private
key d corresponding to IDi , running algorithm Decrypt to decrypt the ciphertext Ci using the private key
d and sending the result to the adversary.

We briefly review the -Decisional Bilinear DiffieHellamn Inversion (-DBDHI) problem and -Weak Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellamn Inversion (-wDBDHI)
problem [1, 2].

• Computability: It is efficient to compute e(u, v) for all
u, v ∈ G.
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Complexity Assumption

Definition 3 Let G and G1 be two multiplicative groups
of prime order p. Let w ∈ G be a generator and β ∈
2

Z∗p . Given elements w, wβ , w(β ) , · · · , w(β ) ∈ G, the DBDHI problem in (G, G1 ) is to decide whether a random
value Z ∈ G1 is equal to e(w, w)1/β or not.

Setup: To generate system parameters for an HIBE of maximum level , select a random generator g in G∗ , a random a ∈ Zp , and set g1 = g a . Next, pick random elements g2 , g3 , h1 , · · · , h ∈ G. The public parameters
and secret master-key are
params = (g, g1 , g2 , g3 , h1 , · · · , h ),

Definition 4 We say that the (t, , )-DBDHI assumption
holds in (G, G1 ) if no t-time algorithm has advantage at
least  in solving the -DBDHI problem in (G, G1 ).

master-key = g2a .
KeyGen(dID , ID): To generate a private key dID for an
identity ID = (I1 , · · · , Ik ) ∈ (Z∗p )k of depth k ≤ ,
using the master secret, pick a random r ∈ Zp and
output


dID = g2a · (hI11 · · · hIkk · g3 )r , g r , hrk+1 , · · · , hr

Definition 5 Let G and G1 be two multiplicative groups of
prime order p. Let g, h ∈ G be two generators and α ∈ Z∗p .
2



(1) Given elements g, h, g α , g (α ) , · · · , g (α ) ∈ G, the wDBDHI problem in (G, G1 ) is to decide whether a
+1
random value Z ∈ G1 is equal to e(g, h)(α ) or not.
2





= a0 , a1 , bk+1 , · · · , b ∈ G2+−k

+2

(2) Given elements g, h, g α , g (α ) , · · · , g (α ) , g (α ) , · · ·
2
, g (α ) ∈ G, the -wDBDHI ∗ problem in (G, G1 ) is
to decide whether a random value Z ∈ G1 is equal to
+1
e(g, h)(α ) or not.

Note that dID becomes shorter as the depth of ID increases. The private key for ID can be generated incrementally, given a private key for the parent identity
IDk−1 = (I1 , · · · , Ik−1 ) ∈ (Z∗p )k−1 , as required. Indeed, let






Ik−1
dID|k−1 = g2a ·(hI11 · · · hk−1
·g3 )r , g r , hrk , · · · , hr

Definition 6 We say that the (t, , )-wDBDHI (*) assumption holds in (G, G1 ) if no t-time algorithm has advantage
at least  in solving the -wDBDHI (*) problem in (G, G1 ).
i
→
Definition 7 Let yi = g (α ) ∈ G∗ and −
y g,a, =
(y1 , · · · , y , y+2 , · · · , y2 ). An algorithm B has advantage
 in solving -wDBDHI ∗ in G if

+1

→
y g,a, , e(g, h)a ) = 0]
P r[B(g, h, −



= a0 , a1 , bk , · · · , b
be the private key for IDk−1 . To generate dID , pick a
random t ∈ Zp and output

dID = a0 · bIkk · (hI11 · · · hIkk · g3 )t , a1 g t s,



→
− P r[B(g, h, −
y g,a, , T ) = 0] ≥ ,


bk+1 htk+1 , · · · , b ht .

where the probability is over the random choice of generators g, h in G∗ , the random choice of α in Z∗p , the random
choice of T ∈ G∗1 , and the random bits consumed by B.
We refer to the distribution on the left as PwBDHI ∗ and the
distribution on the right as RwBDHI ∗ .

3
3.1

The private key is a properly distributed private key for
ID = (I1 , · · · , Ik ) for r = r + t ∈ Zp .
Encrypt(params, ID, M ): We refer to the original BBGHIBE as general encryption. It is not required in our
HIBOOE, but since our HIBOOE decryption is associated with the BBG-HIBE, we outline the scheme as
follows:

HIBOOE from BBG-HIBE
Construction

Let G be a bilinear group of prime order p and let e :
G×G → G1 be a bilinear map. We assume that public keys
(that is, identities ID) at level k are vectors of elements
in (Z∗p )k . We write ID = (I1 , · · · , Ik ) ∈ (Z∗p )k . The
j-th component corresponds to the identity at level j. If
necessary, we extend the construction to public keys over
{0, 1}∗ by first hashing some components {Ij | 1 ≤ j ≤ k}
using a collision resistant hash H : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p . We also
assume that the messages to be encrypted are elements in
G1 . The HIBE system works as follows:

General Encryption: To encrypt a message M ∈ G1
under the public key ID = (I1 , · · · , Ik ) ∈ (Z∗p )k , pick
a random s ∈ Zp and output


Cμ = e(g1 , g2 )s · M, g s , (hI11 · · · hIkk · g3 )s


= c0 , c1 , c2 .
Online/Offline Encryption: We now describe our HI-

2117

BOOE, which is divided into two phases:

the general encryption described earlier in this section
and the message can be recovered with the general decryption procedure as below.

- Offline Encryption: Choose random s, β, α1 , · · · , α
∈ Zp , and output

General Decryption: We refer to the decryption
process of the original BBG-HIBE as general decryption. Consider an identity ID = (I1 , · · · , Ik ). To decrypt a given ciphertext Cμ = (c0 , c1 , c2 ) using the
private key dID = (a0 , a1 , bk+1 , · · · , b ), output

c0 · e(a1 , c2 ) e(c1 , a0 ) = M.

Cof


= e(g1 , g2 )s , (g3α1 h1 )s , · · · , (g3α h )s , (g3β )s , g s


= c0 , c1 , · · · , c , ν1 , ν2 .
Store the offline parameters Cof , β −1 , α1 , · · · , α for
the online phase.

Indeed, for a valid ciphertext, we have
e(g r , (hI11 · · · hIkk · g3 )s )
e(a1 , c2 )
=
e(c1 , a0 )
e(g s , g2a · (hI11 · · · hIkk · g3 )r )

- Online Encryption: Given a message M ∈ G1 and
the public key ID = (I1 , · · · , Ik ) ∈ (Z∗p )k , and output
Con =



c0

· M, β

−1

(1 −

k


1
e(g, g2 )sa
1
=
e(g1 , g2 )s
=

 

αi Ii ) = c0 , ν3 .

i=1

The ciphertext for ID is C = (c0 , c1 , · · · , ck , ν1 , ν2
, ν3 ), where

C = e(g1 , g2 )s · M, (g3α1 h1 )s , · · · , (g3αk hk )s ,
(g3β )s , g s , β −1 (1 −

k


3.2


αi Ii ) .

i=1

Theorem 3.1 Let G be a bilinear group of prime order
p. Suppose the (t, , )-wDBDHI ∗ assumption holds in G.
Then the previously defined -HIBOOE system is (t , qs , )selective identity, chosen plaintext (IND-sID-CPA) secure
for arbitrary , qs , and t < t − Θ(τ qs ), where τ is the
maximum time for an exponention in G.
Proof Sketch. Suppose A has advantage  in attacking the
-HIBOOE system. Using A, we build an algorithm B that
solve the -wDBDHI∗ problem in G.
For a generator g ∈ G and a ∈ Z∗p let yi =
i
g (a ) in G. Algorithm B is given as input a random tuple (g, h, y1 , · · · , y , y+2 , · · · , y2 , T ) that is either sam+1
pled from PwBDHI ∗ (where T = e(g, h)(a ) ) or from
RwBDHI ∗ (where T is uniform and independent in G∗1 ).
Algorithm B’s goal is to output 1 when the input tuple is
sampled from PwBDHI ∗ and 0 otherwise. We do not give
the proof in detail here, due to the limitation of the length
of the paper. Contact the authors if needed.

Dencrypt(dID , C): We describe our HIBOOE decryption
and general decryption in this phase.
HIBOOE Dencryption: Let C = (c0 , c1 , · · · , ck , ν1 ,
ν2 , ν3 ) to be a valid ciphertext for ID =
(I1 , · · · , Ik ) ∈ (Z∗p )k . To decrypt C with dID , compute
c = (c1 )I1 · · · (ck )Ik · (ν1 )ν3
= ((g3α1 h1 )s )I1 · · · ((g3αk hk )s )Ik ·
k

= (g3

i=1

αi Ii I1
h1

−1

Security

We show that our HIBOOE scheme is selective identity secure (IND-sID-CPA) under the Decisional Bilinear
Diffie-Hellman Inversion assumption. As mentioned in
Section 2.3, we use a slightly weaker assumption called the
Weak DBDHI∗ .

Observe that the online phase has a very low computational complexity and the offline phase dose not
require the knowledge of the message and the public
key (ID) of a recipient. The length of ciphertext is
k + 4(k ≤ ), which is acceptable since the parameter
 is limited.

((g3β )s )β

.


(1− k
i=1 αi Ii )

s(1− k
i=1 αi Ii )

Chosen Ciphertext Security. Canetti [5] provided a general method of building an IND-sID-CCA secure -HIBE
from an IND-sID-CPA secure ( + 1)-HIBE. A more efficient construction is given by Boneh and Katz [4]. Applying these methods to our HIBOOE construction results in
IND-sID-CCA secure -HIBOOE for arbitrary .

· · · hIkk )s · g3

= (hI11 · · · hIkk · g3 )s .
We then have (c0 , ν2 , c) = (e(g1 , g2 )s · M, g s ,
(hI11 · · · hIkk · g3 )s ), which is the same as the output of
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4

Comparison

In Advances in Cryptology-Eurocrypt’04,Vol.3027 of
LNCS, pages 223-238. Springer-Verlag,2004.

In a conventional HIBE, some components of ciphertext could also be pre-computed (naturally split an encryption into online/offline phases), but it is inefficient. Our
HIBOOE scheme is much more efficient. We provide a
comparison of computational cost in Table 1. Let “E”
denote the exponentiation in G, “M E” denote the multiexponentiation in G, “M ” denote the modular computation. It’s clear that the algorithm “M ” is much faster than
“E”. We also assume that the message is encrypted under
the public key ID = (I1 , · · · , I ) ∈ (Z∗p ) .
Scheme
Offline phase
Store in offline
Online phase

BBG-HIBE
( + 3)E
+3
E

[2] D. Boneh, X. Boyen, and E. J. Goh. Hierarchical Identity Based Encryption with Constant Size Ciphertext.
In Cramer [16], pages 440-456. Full version available
at Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2005/015.
[3] D. Boneh and M. Franklin. Identity-based encryption
from the Weil pairing. In Joe Kilian, editor, Advances
in Cryptology-CRYPTO 2001, volume 2139 of LNCS,
pages 213-229. Springer-Verlag, 2001.
[4] D. Boneh and J. Katz. Improved efficiency for CCAsecure cryptosystems built using identity based encryption. In Proceedings of RSA-CT’05, LNCS 3376, pp.
87-103, 2005.

Our HIBOOE
ME+3E
2 + 4
2M

[5] R. Canetti, S. Halevi, and J. Katz. Chosen-ciphertext security from identity-based encryption. In C. Cachin and
J. Camenisch, editors, Proceedings of Eurocrypt 2004,
volume 3027 of LNCS, pages 207-222. Springer, 2004.

Table 1. This table presents a comparison of
the related HIBE schemes under the IND-sIDCPA secure model. It shows that the online
phase of our scheme is much more efficient
than the conventional scheme.

5

[6] C. Gentry. Practical Identity-Based Encryption Without Random Oracles. In Advance of Eurocrypt’06,
vol.4004 of LNCS, pages 445-464. Springer-Verlag,
2006.
[7] F. Guo, Y. Mu, and Z. Chen. Identity-Based Online/Offline Encryption. Proceedings of FC 2008,
LNCS 5143, pp. 247-261. Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2008.

Conclusion

In this paper, we extended the notion of Identity-based
Online/offline Encryption to Hierarchical Identity-Based
Online/Offline Encryption (HIBOOE) and proposed an efficient scheme, which is useful for devices with limited computational power. Our HIBOOE construction from BBGHIBE [2] is provably secure without random oracles. In the
encryption phase, the offline phase encryption can be run
without the message to be encrypted and the public key (or
ID) of a recipient and the online phase encryption is extremely efficient with only two modular computations.

[8] C. Gentry and A. Silverberg. Hierarchical ID-Based
Cryptography. In Proc. ASIACRYPT 2002, volume
2501 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 548566. Springer-Verlag, 2002.
[9] J. Horwitz and B. Lynn. Towards hierarchical
identity-based encryption. In Advances in CryptologyEUROCRYPT 2002, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 466-481. Springer-Verlag, 2002.
[10] A. Shamir. Identity-based cryptosystems and signature schemes. In Advances in Cryptology-CRYPTO
1984, volume 196 of LNCS, pages 47-53. SpringerVerlag, 1984.
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